A model of adverse selection when teams form endogenously highlights the relationship between discrimination and occupational choice. It shows discrimination can persist even when management allocates credit fairly, if worker beliefs about discrimination in ‡uence their decision to engage in teamwork. Furthermore, among those choosing to work as entrepreneurs or in other individualistic occupations, discrimination victims outperform bene…ciaries.
Introduction
A young black man …nishes law school. He wonders, "Should I join a large …rm or hang out my own shingle?" A newly minted Latina engineer ponders whether she should join a tiny startup or accept the job o¤er of a giant technology multinational. The decision to be an entrepreneur or an employee is among the most consequential any individual will ever face. Does race or gender in ‡uence that choice? Could discrimination a¤ect occupational performance?
Several empirical studies on occupational segregation suggest (1) minorities are more likely to choose (or be chosen for) occupations in which teamwork plays a minimal role and (2) that minorities excel in these individualistic positions. For example, Clark and Drinkwater (2000) document minority over-representation in the British self-employment sector, even have identical ability ex ante. The discriminatory equilibrium resembles the one presented here, but "ex ante" in their models means "at birth" Since minorities and non-minorities acquire di¤erent human capital, they no longer possess identical ability when they take jobs.
In this paper discrimination is classically statistical, arising from imperfect observability of worker productivity. Team synergy both incents workers to collaborate and obscures their individual contributions. Although minorities who select into teams di¤er from those who do not, the overall populations of minorities and non-minorities always have statistically identical ability. The signal in this sorting model is slightly more complex than in others.
In Arrow's and Coate and Loury's models, race alone (eventually) correlates to ability, but in this model, it is the interaction of race and observable self-selection, which informs the manager.
The model relates in a secondary way to the literature on team productivity. Since Alchian and Demsetz' (1972) discussion of the free-rider problem inherent in teams, the team literature has focused on moral hazard in e¤ort. 4 Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) empirically suggest that this focus on free-riding in teams is too narrow, because even when individual incentives are feasible, many …rms implement group incentives to increase productivity. 5 Accounting for such synergies, my model examines the selection in team formation that occurs before any moral hazard can-imperfect observability of individual contributions in teams drives both. Because teamwork is always synergistic in the model this selection into individualistic work is adverse for society and …rm alike-incomplete information causes both to su¤er a productive loss.
This adverse selection creates a link between discrimination and occupational choice, especially with respect to the entrepreneurial decision, that the literature has not discussed.
But adverse selection in team formation also happens in traditional …rms, even though most 4 See Holmström 1982, McAfee and McMillan 1991, Legros and Matthews 1993 among many others. 5 First, Hamilton et al (2003) capture an 18% productivity increase in a garment factory after a change from individual piece rate compensation to group piece rate pay. Second, they attribute about a …fth of that increase to the fact that high ability workers were more likely to join teams but the remaining 14% is attributable to the synergistic team e¤ect. High ability workers were no more likely to leave the company than low ability ones after joining a team. These …ndings counter the free-riding theories, which have dominated economic analysis of teams. employees cannot choose their coworkers. When a manager hires all employees, the teamwork decision and, hence, adverse selection often remain. Presented with a menu of tasks, an employee may choose an individual task with high management visibility over another, in which his contribution may be lost because of the number and rank of other contributors. 6 The common managerial performance critique, "(not) a team player" indicates that even when tasks are completely assigned, how they are performed can be an expression of the teamwork decision. The model applies to any situation in which workers can trade o¤ synergy for visibility.
Basic Model
Two workers, A and B, decide to produce individually, say as entrepreneurs, or together, say as employees at a large …rm. A and B have positive abilities, and respectively, drawn randomly from identical independent distributions. Abilities are known to both A and B but unobservable to management. Worker names (i.e. A or B) are the only available attribute of discrimination.
A and B produce their respective abilities when working individually (i.e. individualistic technology is linear in ability with slope 1). Teams produce g( ; ). Assume team production is Symmetric:
g (x; y) = g (y; x) Synergistic: g ( ; 0) and g( ; ) > + 8 ; > 0;
A manager determines the portion of team credit (or production) due each worker. This credit may be compensation or a manager identifying her next promotee. The fraction of team credit assigned to A is denoted by , where lies in the unit interval. B receives the remainder. Thus, represents the strength of discrimination: = 1 represents a world in which A gets all credit from group work and = 0 one in which he gets none. 6 Even such characteristics such as job title or seniority can be attributes of discrimination to the extent they are imperfectly correlated to private ability. A gifted junior employee may rather work alone than share a majority of credit with a mediocre senior one.
Without loss of generality, I restrict 2 1 2 ; 1 ; so that B always denotes the minority. For every discriminatory equilibrium belief, > 1 2 , favoring A, model symmetry induces another,
, favoring B. Analysis, though, is limited to 1 2 . Importantly, a solo worker always receives all credit for his work. A and B have common beliefs on . 7 Each worker chooses teamwork if and only it would make him (weakly) better o¤ than working individualistically. A team forms if and only both workers choose teamwork ( Table   1 describes the game in normal form). Thus, each worker has a clear dominant strategy.
Worker A chooses T eam if and only if
Otherwise he chooses Solo. Similarly, worker B chooses T eam if and only if
and Solo otherwise. Table 1 . Normal form of the simultaneous game.
Employment law constrains the manager to allocate credit according to employees'relative contributions as well as she can with available information. 8 Each team member should receive rewards commensurate with his relative contribution to the team, but since teamwork obscures individual contribution, the manager has limited information about team members' individual contributions. However, the manager has a useful piece of information: her employees chose to work for her rather than for themselves-they chose teamwork. Thus, a 7 Assuming that victims and bene…ciaries believe that discrimination exists to a common degree is strong, but the assuming common beliefs is standard in BNE analysis. Likewise, one may assume that the abilities of previous employees working on teams have been revealed to the manager to give some basis for beliefs, but this is not strictly necessary for the analyisis. 8 Statistical discrimination is illegal in the US; however, since the burden of proof that an employer is not paying equally for equal work belongs to the employee, this constraint of the model is practical.
central quantity of interest is the non-minority's average fraction of ability in all teams that form under a given set of beliefs, E h + j team; i . 9 If work was completed as a team, the manager credits A equal to his expected proportion of total team ability, given that the work was done as a team. In a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), if the manager is assigning credit according to merit, this fraction must, in expectation, equal the credit split, , that
A and B believed when they decided to form a team:
In other words, a particular set of teams will form in a society that believes discrimination of level exists; if is also non-minorities' expected relative contribution on those teams then the discrimination is fair ex post and the beliefs are self-reinforcing.
Analysis
In deciding whether or not to join the team, a worker compares his fraction of (realized) total team ability to the fraction of team credit he believes he will receive. I refer to the ratio of these two quantities as his discriminatory alignment. The discriminatory alignment of A is + = , while B's is + = (1 ) : If this discriminatory alignment is less than unity then team production must be su¢ ciently synergistic for that worker to choose teamwork. 10 For example, if team production were only slightly synergistic (i.e. g ( ; ) = + + "; where " > 0 is very small) it is easy to see that (C A ) and (C B ) would only be satis…ed by pairs of workers whose discriminatory alignment is approximately equal to 1 (i.e. + = and + =
(1 ))-only worker pairs whose abilities mirror their beliefs about discrimination will team up. At the other extreme, suppose that team production were extremely synergistic, say g ( ; ) = +1. Then, regardless of the workers' discriminatory alignments, a team forms-both workers will choose teamwork regardless of each other's ability or the perceived level of discrimination. 9 Although the denominator does not re ‡ect the total output of the team in the above above de…nition of meritocracy, it is trivial to show that the alternative formulation,
i , where
is the unique normalizer such that
i is equivalent. 10 If it is greater than unity for one worker then it is less than unity for the other.
It is easy to visualize the e¤ects of synergy and beliefs about discrimination by graphing (C A ) and (C B ) over the workers'joint ability sample space. Figures 1 and 2 represents the locus of realizations of and for which discriminatory alignment equals unity-this locus of pairings will forms teams regardless of the synergy level. Comparing the two …gures, one observes that as synergy increases, the team forming region expands to include more and more pairings besides just those with discriminatory alignment equal to 1.
Note also that as beliefs about discrimination change, the boundaries of the team forming region created by (C A ) and (C B ) both move in the direction of the change in beliefs-the composition of teams (at least) loosely re ‡ects society's discriminatory beliefs. What is not shown in the …gures, but will be a focus of the analysis, is the probability density of abilities over the sample space-for it is the expectation of abilities over the team forming regions and regions of individualistic work that lead to the main results.
To illustrate the basic insights of the model, I analyze a simple two-type case. More general settings are analyzed in Section 5.1. For exposition assume the following team production function: g( ; ) = ( + ) where measures synergy ( > 1). Let ; 2 fH; Lg ; where H > L > 0; be independently and identically distributed as follows:
I …rst establish the intuitive result that if workers believe that no discrimination exists, then, in this completely symmetric world with fair management, none will. But such beliefs are 11 Figure 1 was generated with g H ( ; ) = + + and H = 5 8 . Figure 2 was generated with g L ( ; ) = + + 1 4 and L = Since workers have iid ability, if they believe management thinks observable characteristics are orthogonal to ability, workers will disregard observables in choosing teammates.
Fair managers will then disregard observables too, and egalitarianism will be an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 part (a) holds for all distributions and production functions (see the Appendix for a proof).
Even absent any discrimination, teams will not always form, though teamwork is e¢ cient.
Thus, egalitarianism does not alleviate adverse selection. Proposition 1 part (b) can be restated for general distributions and productions functions: Under egalitarianism, a team will form i¤ the synergy of production is greater than the di¤erence in worker abilities (see the Appendix for a proof).
As synergy declines in an egalitarian world, only individuals of very similar ability will team up. If synergy results from labor specialization or leadership, this homogeneity may be undesirable. In fact, Hamilton, et al. (2003) …nd that, with average ability held constant, heterogeneous teams are more productive. 13 Figure 3 graphically depicts the team forming 12 The notation for indexing key synergy levels can be thought of in the following way: 4 is the threshold above which all four possible ability realizations form a team under egalitarianism, 3 and 4 represent the thresholds between which three but not four realizations will form teams if beliefs are those speci…ed in Proposition 2. Finally 2 represents the threshold below which one realization, but not two will form if beliefs are those speci…ed in Proposition 3. 13 The reader will observe that g ( ; ) = ( + ) does not increase with hetrogeneity of ability. Although a team production function with negative cross partials with respect to ability may re ‡ect Hamilton et al's empirical …ndings better, the example function is conservative in that it overstates productivity under Figure 3 : Egalitarianism is always an equilibrium, but when synergy is low ( 4 ) adverse selection prevents teamwork between heterogenous pairings. region of the ability sample space when < 4 ; observe that heterogenous pairings hH; Li and hL; Hi fall outside of the team forming region; they result in individualistic work.
Each of the following two propositions identi…es a discriminatory equilibrium. That is, if workers believe that discrimination (of a particular level) exists, they will form teams such that a fair manager will reinforce those beliefs. The …rst equilibrium is mild, causing both homogeneous and heterogeneous ability teams to form. The second equilibrium is severely discriminatory, and only heterogeneous teams form. equilibrium in which both homogeneous teams and heterogeneous teams form. Formally,
is a discriminatory equilibrium in which realizations h ; i 2 fhH; Hi ; hH; Li ; hL; Lig form teams.
Proof. 
Proposition 3 If synergy is not extremely strong, then there exists a severely discriminatory equilibrium in which only heterogeneous teams form. Formally,
is a discriminatory equilibrium in which realizations h ; i 2 fhH; Ligform teams. Propositions 1-3 say that if synergy is so strong that everyone chooses teamwork all the time, egalitarianism is the only equilibrium, but as it declines (1) discriminatory and egalitarian equilibria coexist (note that 3 < 4 < 4 and 4 < 2 ) and (2) adverse selection prevents e¢ cient team formation under egalitarianism and discrimination alike. ( 2 ) and society believes discrimination is severe only pairings with discriminatory alignment = 1 will team up.
Conventional wisdom holds that discriminating against anyone on an attribute that has no direct causal link to productivity cannot improve output and may very well be counterproductive. Indeed, since any pair working together produces more than the two working alone, in a …rst-best world all possible parings would cooperate and egalitarianism would be the only equilibrium. But adverse selection creates a tension between social optimality and egalitarianism, because the severity of this adverse selection is not equal under both regimes-as falls below 4 and until it falls below 3 (always an open interval), more teamwork occurs under the discriminatory equilibrium of Proposition 2. In this case, conventional wisdom is specious:
(1 p e )) that is socially preferable to egalitarianism. (ii) If minorities gain more from additional teams formed under discrimination than they loose from discrimination in teams that exist under egalitarianism
then both minorities and non-minorities are better o¤ under the discriminatory equilibrium than egalitarianism.
Proof. Part (i): Since every team that forms under egalitarianism also forms under discrimination, and teams always outproduce their members working individually, part (i) is immediate.
Part (ii): Minorities and non-minorities as groups alike, prefer discrimination if and only if their expected returns under that regime are higher than under egalitarianism. Clearly, nonminorities always prefer discrimination-their payo¤ is strictly higher under discrimination when teams form (i.e.h ; i 2 fhH; Hi ; hH; Li ; hL; Lig) and exactly the same when teams do not form under either regime (i.e..h ; i 2 fhL; Hig). On the other hand, minorities, as a group, prefer discrimination to egalitarianism i¤
This simpli…es to the form of the condition in part (ii) of the proposition.
The following simple numerical example veri…es the existence of parameter sets which satisfy the conditions of Proposition 4 parts (i) and (ii): ) and synergy is moderate (i.e. = 5 4 ) society produces more under the discriminatory equilibrium (i.e. = on average and minorities earn 28 16 on average.
Clearly discrimination harms many individuals-in the equilibrium of Proposition 4 minorities joining homogenous teams are harmed. By many moral frameworks, that alone justi…es its eradication. If it also unequivocally harmed society's overall productivity, policy aimed at ending discrimination could be justi…ed on purely economic (utilitarian) grounds.
Lamentably, Proposition 4 dispels such an unambiguous justi…cation: with respect to productivity, egalitarianism is not always socially preferable to discrimination; in fact, discrimination may be preferred by both minorities and non-minorities as groups. 14 Proposition 4
highlights the potential tension facing policy makers between e¢ ciency and equity.
What intuition lies behind this unsettling result? An increase in discrimination induces some new teams to form and some existing ones to break up. The new teams' increased output is a societal gain, but society loses output from those individuals formerly working on teams. Whether or not the gain exceeds the loss depends on the speci…c distribution of ability and team production function.
If synergy is very low only those teams near the central locus will form; the productivity di¤erence between egalitarianism and discrimination (and individual work) is minimal. As synergy increases, the productivity di¤erence can grow. Although beyond the scope of this model, in which the manager is constrained to be fair, these observations suggest that 14 Lundberg and Startz'(1983) conclude egalitarianism is always socially preferable. In their model, discrimination shifts training from individuals with lower costs for it to those with higher costs. In this one, discrimination may enable synergistic production when egalitarianism may not, and the increased productivity comes not from a change in the individual, but rather the choice of production technology.
competing …rms. Some …rms in each industry choose seniority based compensation (i.e. discriminatory) schemes while others compensate teammates equally. In industries with moderate ( 3 < 4 ) synergy levels only seniority based …rms survive due to the e¢ ciency gains of discrimination, and, of course, seniority both re ‡ects the relative contribution of teammates and is the right competitive "strategy" ex post. In industries with synergy outside this range, egalitarian …rms dominate.
The productivity of society is the productivity of its members. The equilibrium de…nition describes the relative productivity of minorities and non-minorities on teams, but what about those working alone? And minorities versus non-minorities overall? Victims and bene…ciaries remain statistically identical with respect to ability across the population at large, but not among those working on teams-this is precisely why a fair manager can discriminate after observing the teamwork decision.
Proposition 5 Among those working individually, discrimination victims outperform bene…ciaries on average.
Proof. The proposition can be formally written
which can be veri…ed under each discriminatory equilibrium.
L < H The model predicts greater success for self-selected minority entrepreneurs. Very able discrimination victims have the lowest discriminatory alignment, especially when potential partners are incompetent, and thus have the greatest incentive to work as individuals. Since a rejection of teamwork induces victim and bene…ciary alike to work independently, victims have higher average ability in the solo working population. This intuition holds for general distributions and production functions (see the Appendix for a proof).
In the model presented here, a rejection by either teammate means both work alone.
However, one of the teammates would have preferred teamwork. If either had another potential teamwork opportunity he might try again. Thus, in a market for teammates, the probability of rejection matters. The following two lemmas show that when teamwork is endogenous, adverse selection works causes two groups to eschew teamwork: (1) talented individuals and (2) discrimination victims.
Lemma 1 Talented individuals reject teamwork more often.
Proof. LetÃ be the event that A rejects teamwork (i.e. g ( ; ) ) andB be the event B rejects teamwork (i.e. g ( ; ) (1 ) ). Given that there is a rejection, the probability that the more able did it (recall that only one worker will reject due to synergy) can be written
where all probabilities are conditional onÃ [B. This holds i¤
which is always true.
Lemma 2 Discrimination victims reject teamwork (with bene…ciaries) more often.
This suggests that talented individuals and discrimination victims reject teamwork more overall, choosing di¤erent work than discrimination bene…ciaries and those of lesser ability. This may explain why Russia's entrepreneurs are smart and short (see introduction).
Likewise, as suggested by the occupational segregation in sports (also highlighted in the introduction), even among those traditionally employed, discrimination victims and the gifted will choose individually measurable occupations over synergistic ones.
The natural context in which to empirically measure discrimination is when minorities and non-minorities are working side by side, such as within …rms. Since, job duties can be compared and management is consistent, it is the setting in which legal disputes over workplace discrimination are most easily waged. And indeed, discrimination in these team
settings is precisely what the model captures, but minority and non-minority workers in teams do not represent the populations as a whole, because occupational choice is endogenous. Thus, this measure of discrimination does not re ‡ect the overall adversity faced by minorities in the population. Since, by Proposition 5, discrimination victims outperform bene…ciaries when working individually, the following is immediate:
Proposition 6 Discrimination victims receive more than 1 of total societal output on average.
A high ability minority worker can opt out of discriminatory teams, say by choosing entrepreneurship or another occupation where individual contribution is more measurable.
Thus, measuring discrimination as wage di¤erences only within team settings overestimates the overall negative relative impact of discrimination on minorities-there is a selection bias due to the entrepreneurial choices of talented minorities. In fact, as the following example paradoxically shows, the total relative impact of discrimination on minorities need not be negative at all.
Example 2 If High ability is rare (i.e. p = is a discriminatory equilibrium-non-minorities receive 125% (i.e. 1 ) what minorities do in teams. Despite the high synergy of teamwork, the presence of discrimination and the relative rarity of individual work (i.e.
64
11% of the time), minorities receive over 127% of the credit that non-minorities receive overall.
Proposition 5, Lemmas 1 and 2 as well as Proposition 6 hold under any discriminatory beliefs, even if those beliefs are not con…rmed by a fair manager; that is, need not be a self-reinforcing BNE. For example, even if the manager has a preference for employees of one race over another (i.e. she is not fair) as is assumed in some other models of discrimination (e.g. Becker, 1957) , talented minorities will still strategically respond by opting out of teams.
We conclude the basic analysis by considering some comparative statics of the self reinforcing equilibrium of the model.
In one industry all workers may produce at similar levels, but in another the gap between highly productive workers and low productivity ones may be large. How does this production sensitivity to ability impact discrimination? Can di¤erent industries support di¤erent levels of statistical discrimination?
Proposition 7 As the ability gap between High and Low types increases, so does (a) discrimination (in any discriminatory equilibrium) and (b) the maximum synergy, for which discriminatory equilibria exist.
Proposition 7 predicts that discrimination will be stronger in occupations, in which the (relevant) ability of workers exhibits higher variance. To see the intuition behind part (a) recall that discriminatory beliefs are an equilibrium, because on teams the expected type of bene…ciaries is higher than victims'-either bene…ciaries (on teams) are more likely to be High ability, less likely to be Low ability or both. Thus, if High increases or Low decreases, the expected ability gap increases and so does discrimination. The intuition behind part (b)
is also simple. A High ability worker will work with a Low ability worker even if he believes he will be the victim of discrimination, so long as synergy is high enough. If this happens, a fair manager cannot discriminate (i.e. discrimination cannot be an equilibrium). But if the ability gap between these two increases even more, then these two may not work together, and now a fair manager must discriminate. Proposition 7 predicts discrimination will be strongest within the highest tiered departments.
Extensions
The simple model can be generally extended in several ways: (1) ability distributions and production functions can be made general, (2) a market for teammates can be added,
workers may have incomplete information about potential teammates'ability, (4) the credit split can be made contractible on the output, and (5) the sharing rule can be changed. In this section, I consider these extensions individually-discriminatory equilibria survive all of them.
General Ability Distributions and Production Functions
One might worry that the existence of discriminatory equilibria is an artifact of the two type model or a very speci…c team production function. The next two propositions reassure that they are not. One additional de…nition is required:
De…nition 1 If an individual with no ability whatsoever joins a team and production is not improved (i.e. g (x; 0) = x), and teamwork ampli…es ability (i.e.
then team production is regular:
Example 3 g ( ; ) = + + is a regular production function.
Proposition 8
If team production is regular, and ability is continuously distributed with support from 0, then at least one discriminatory equilibrium ( 2
; 1 ) exists in which teams form.
15
Proof. The proof in the Appendix has the following steps: ; 1 .
Proposition 8 provides a su¢ cient but unnecessary condition for discriminatory equilibria to exist. There may be many such equilibria; Proposition 8 simply says that under reasonable conditions, at least one set of discriminatory beliefs exists such that workers will choose teamwork strategically such that a fair manager will con…rm those beliefs. Regularity guarantees that the second step of the proof holds-many irregular production functions also satisfy the second step of the proof but must be handled on a case by case basis.
The concept of BNE, considered so far, is precise-an equilibrium exists whenever = i . This, as the following proposition highlights, is a much looser condition than BNE and may hold for a very wide set of beliefs that are not, strictly speaking, equilibria. 15 Obviously, beliefs 2 f0; 1g are always discriminatory equilibria; however, since no teams form under these beliefs, they are of little interest by themselves.
Proposition 9
If ability is continuously distributed with support from 0 and synergy is low enough, the credit split of a fair manager will be arbitrarily close to con…rming any beliefs.
Formally, if synergy is measured by a = g ( ; )
, then for all " > 0; 0 < a
Proof.
Thus, for all a " ( + ) the above reduces to
Low synergy produces not only few teams but ones in which discriminatory beliefs re ‡ect workers'respective actual, not just expected, abilities quite precisely. Thus, when synergy is very low, any discrimination level is close to an equilibrium.
This observation presents an empirical challenge. For example, the 1963 Equal Pay Act says that US employers must pay employees equally for equal work; however, the burden of establishing a prima facie case that di¤erent wages are paid to employees of the opposite sex and that the employees perform substantially equal work belongs to the employee. While US law prohibits even statistical discrimination, this burden of proof amounts to showing that the proportion of wages paid to men is statistically di¤erent from their proportional
where " is the measurement error. Proposition 9 implies that establishing that meritocracy is not functioning may be more di¢ cult in low synergy industries, because the measurement error must be smaller.
Frictionless Market for Teammates
The basic model implicitly assumes no market for teammates; a rejection by either teammate means both work alone. Of course, in the real world, the outside option of an individual deciding whether or not to join a team, is not usually limited to working alone, but rather includes working on one of several di¤erent teams. Here I examine the extreme opposite situation, namely that the market for teammates is frictionless-every worker in the economy is a potential teammate. I will show that, even in this extreme case, discriminatory equilibria can still exist, and thus we should expect them in a more realistic market with frictions.
Suppose all workers who reject teamwork (or are rejected) randomly draw new potential teammates from the pool of individual workers until every worker (a) …nds a teammate, (b) rejects or is rejected by all remaining individual workers. Without loss of generality, assume minorities and majorities each have an even number of individuals with each supported ability.
Lemma 3 In a frictionless market for teammates, no one works individually.
Proof. Suppose someone chose to work individually. By symmetry another identical worker also did. These two could team up without facing discrimination and, because team production is synergistic, both be better o¤, a contradiction.
Can discrimination exist in a frictionless market for teammates? For simplicity, assume ability distributed as in (2) and that all workers assume discrimination exists. Clearly, High ability victims will always work together to avoid discrimination. Similarly Low ability bene…ciaries will work together because no one else will work with them. Thus, if a heterogeneous team were to form, it could only be between a High ability bene…ciary and a Low ability victim. A fair manager, seeing a team, would know this and divide credit accordingly: = H H+L . These teams would form if and only if both parties prefer this heterogeneous team to working with their peers (i.e. those with identical discriminatory attribute and ability):
Thus, we have proved the following proposition: As noted previously, Hamilton, et al. (2003) empirically …nd that heterogeneous teams produce more. So, one should not be surprised to …nd discriminatory compensation even if a perfect markets for teammates existed. Since, discriminatory equilibria exist both when the market for teammates does not exist and when it has no frictions, one can reasonably conclude that they exist in a more realistic imperfect market for teammates.
Lemma 2 suggested one cause of occupational segregation, namely that minorities will prefer occupations where individual contribution is more easily measured. Proposition 10 highlights a second possible cause of occupational segregation that exists even when there are no substantive di¤erences between jobs-minorities may simply choose to team with other minorities to strategically eliminate the possibility of discrimination.
Incomplete Information
Although teammates almost certainly know each other's ability better than their manager, it could be di¢ cult to know exactly how much a potential partner will contribute before production occurs. What if signals of a potential teammate's ability were noisy?
At the one extreme, workers may be able to communicate their types to each other almost perfectly. Suppose that there are …nitely many ability types, and that with probability worker i observes j's true ability and with probability 1 he observes a uniform draw from the type space instead. If the noise is small (i.e. is very near 1), then, since each worker type has a strict incentive to join a team (or not), the resulting team formation distribution will be arbitrarily close to the complete information speci…cation. As a consequence, the manager's beliefs about the relative abilities of A and B workers will be arbitrarily close as well and all equilibria under complete information will persist in a model with slightly noisy signals.
At the other extreme, workers could observe nothing about each other's ability ex ante.
In this extreme case, workers have the same information about the other worker as their manager. Here it is convenient to invoke the simple two type model again. The following lemma proves useful in analyzing this case:
Lemma 4 Suppose workers have no speci…c information about potential teammates' types.
In all equilibria, untalented A workers always choose teamwork.
The above lemma follows directly from the fact that all teamwork is synergistic and A will capture at least half of the product.
From the lemma it is immediately clear that a number of the equilibria in identi…ed in
Section 4 no longer exist. The severely discriminatory equilibrium of Proposition 2 cannot survive-low ability A workers will sneak into teams too. Since low ability A workers will also sneak into teams with high ability Bs in the moderately discriminatory equilibrium of Proposition 3, this equilibrium also breaks. Given that both discriminatory equilibria from the complete information case no longer exist, one may doubt whether discrimination is possible when workers have no speci…c information about the ability of potential teammates.
However, the following proposition shows that new discriminatory equilibria can arise when information is imperfect:
Proposition 11 When workers have no speci…c information about potential teammates' ability and synergy is linear (g ( ; ) = ( + ) ) there always exists a non-empty synergy
is a discriminatory equilibrium, in which teams h ; i 2 fhH; Li ; hL; Lig form. Now I will show that for any team production function exhibiting increasing di¤erences, including when synergy is linear, untalented Bs also choose teamwork. Formally,
After substituting the equilibrium beliefs ; the second derivative of the left hand side (LHS) with respect to p is
which is strictly negative, because g exhibits increasing di¤erences. This concavity implies that the LHS of (3) has a minimum at p 2 f0; 1g. When p = 0 the LHS of (3) reduces to 1 2 g (L; L), which is strictly greater than the right hand side L. Similarly, when p = 1 the
LHS of (3) reduces to L g(H;L) H+L
, which is also strictly greater than the right hand side L. Thus (3) always holds-untalented Bs never wish to deviate.
With linear synergy talented As choose teamwork i¤ (H + L) > H
which reduces to the lower bound of the synergy range speci…ed by the proposition.
Talented Bs choose individualistic work (i.e. they cannot deviate) i¤
which reduces to the upper bound of the synergy range.
Finally, the synergy range of the lemma is non-empty if and only if the lower boundary is strictly less than the upper. Cross multiplying yields
which always holds.
Note that the parameters of Example 1 also lead to a discriminatory equilibrium when workers cannot communicate information about their ability, but discrimination is stronger
) now, because homogenous high ability teams no longer form-incomplete information increases the potential for adverse selection. This is intuitive, since talented minorities cannot a¤ord the risk that their non-minority teammate may not be as gifted.
Thus, discriminatory equilibria may exist whether the signal noise is arbitrarily small or arbitrarily large,although the possible equilibria may, in fact, change with signal quality.
More fundamentally, discrimination does not arise just because the workers are communicating something to each other that the manager cannot observe. Rather the opportunity for discrimination comes from the fact that the workers cannot credibly reveal information to the manager-not being able to reveal that information to teammates only make the potential for adverse selection and discrimination worse. Recognizing this fact, the implicit assumption that potential teammates cannot transfer utility to each other does not seem arti…cially limiting-when teammates cannot credibly communicate their type ex ante, o¤ering a side payment for cooperation (to o¤set discrimination) is infeasible.
Incomplete information also increases adverse selection under egalitarian beliefs. Notice that Lemma 4 also implies that even under egalitarian beliefs high ability workers cannot guarantee that their potential team is similarly skilled. So, if synergy is not strong enough to induce teams of heterogenous ability ( 2H H+L = 4 ), high ability workers (both A and B)
will eschew teamwork-their potential teammates may not be competent enough to justify splitting credit with them. Thus, without high synergy, only untalented workers will team up together under egalitarian beliefs and incomplete information.
Furthermore, it is always true that A < 4 < B . So, there always a non-empty synergy interval where the following two equilibria co-exist: (1) under egalitarian beliefs only untalented workers cooperate, and (2) under discriminatory beliefs both untalented workers cooperate and talented non-minorities cooperate with untalented minorities. The set of teams formed under egalitarianism is a proper subset of those formed under discrimination.
So, the following version of Proposition 4 is immediate:
Proposition 4 (Incomplete Information) When workers have no speci…c information about potential teammates'ability and synergy is linear ( g ( ; ) = ( + ) ), if A < 4 , then society produces more and both minorities as well as non-minorities are better o¤ under the discriminatory equilibrium than egalitarianism.
Although discriminatory equilibria may still exist and Proposition 4 even sharpens when workers have no ex ante information about their teammates'abilities, notice that if synergy is low enough, discriminatory equilibria disappear altogether. Why? Intuitively, it is because the lowest ability workers always have the greatest incentives to join teams-although this is especially true of bene…ciaries of discrimination, it is also true of untalented victims.
Talented workers know this and, when informed about potential teammates' abilities, can cooperate selectively. Without this information, though, talented workers take a risk on the abilities of their teammates, a risk that can be o¤set by synergy; however, with very little synergy, only the lowest ability workers can a¤ord the risk of blind cooperation. Thus, due to the symmetry of the model, only egalitarianism survives.
Of course, the manager may also get some signal of her employees' abilities. In this model, output itself is a strong signal of worker abilities. In the next section, I consider the impact of such a signal on equilibria.
Equilibria with Contractible Output
Previous analysis assumes that the fractional credit split did not depend on the realized output. The system of o¤ering a salary to join a team and a proportional bonus based on company pro…tability …ts this setting. The total bonus amount is tied to team output, but the fraction relative to one's peers is not. Similarly, corporate shares and options are typically divvied up before their exercisable worth is ever known; an output contractible split is impossible. Some compensation schemes, though, do recognize team output when splitting the reward. For example, Senior team member bonuses may more closely tied to team output than Junior members'.
Could the existence of discriminatory equilibria stem from the manager's inability to contract on the realized output? After all, the manager learns a great deal about her employees' abilities from the team's output. This subsection shows that discriminatory equilibria can exist even when the manager can contract on team output. This requires that the credit split be a function of team output, (Q), where Q = g( ; ).
Theoretically, very little changes. The de…nition of equilibrium beliefs changes to
This means the belief set is much more complex; workers must have beliefs for each possible output level. Without additional restrictions imposed on equilibria, workers may rationally believe that the manager severely discriminates if she observes low output, moderately discriminates if she observes typical output and does not discriminate at all for exceptional output. It is not di¢ cult to see that, in general, describing even a single complete set of beliefs could be extremely cumbersome (not just as a researcher, but also as a manager or worker). Nevertheless, a few examples reveal that discriminatory equilibria may exist, even when the manager can contract on the extra information contained in the output itself. is an a equilibrium belief, which forms a team if and only if h ; i 2 fhH; Li ; hM; M ig. 16 This example illustrates that although the manager may gain some information from output, she cannot, in general, completely resolve employee contributions, and thus the opportunity for discrimination persists. Furthermore, while it is clear that the above example is constructed to make this point, a manager would have even greater di¢ culty resolving contribution if there were many types or a continuum of types, from which many possible teams could produce identical output.
But perhaps surprisingly, even when output completely reveals the contribution of individual workers, discrimination can persist. Consider the severely discriminatory equilibrium 16 Although the example illustrates the persistence of discriminatory equilibria with familiar linearly synergistic team production (g ( ; ) = ( + ) ), there is nothing special about that form. When the same ability distribution holds, but team production has constant synergy (g ( ; ) = + + ) then when synergy satis…es
is an equilibrium belief, which forms the same teams.
of Proposition 2. In this case, the manager knows exactly what each teammate contributes before production occurs. Thus, observing the output adds no information above and beyond what discrimination tells her-the equilibrium is identical whether output is contractible or not. Of course, if beliefs were egalitarian and an (o¤-equilibrium) heterogenous team formed, then the manager would not know which worker was high ability and which was low before or after production.
Thus, despite the increased complexity of calculating complete belief sets contingent on output, versions of the previous propositions still hold with similar proofs. Also, although I have not explicitly modeled a separate signal of worker abilities available to the manager, the exercise here gives strong intuition that so long as the manager cannot perfectly observe worker types without discriminating, the potential for discrimination exists.
Shapley Values
In the basic model, a manager is fair if she divides team produce according to average ability.
From the perspective that (in the model) ability is the only parameter an individual brings to the team this seems appropriate; however, if one is willing include parameters not associated with the individual alone, say by combining the …rm's team production function with the mix of individual member abilities, then other sharing rules are possible. For example, by combining the possible ability levels of all team members together with information about the production function the manager may be able to calculate the average marginal contribution of each member and compensate according to that measure. In this subsection, I will show that discriminatory equilibria may still exist under such an allocation rule.
The most common way to fairly allocate cooperative gains is by using Shapley values (Shapley 1953 )-they use the marginal contributions of members as inputs. Since a Shapley value represents a total allocation due a player in a coalition game, rather than a proportional measure like ; they do not scale with output. Thus, using Shapley values, which completely distribute all surplus, requires that the level of output be …xed. Therefore, I restrict attention to settings where compensation is contractible on observed team output.
However, as was illustrated in Section 5.4, output alone is not enough to reveal the contributions of team members and is, thus, insu¢ cient to generally determine team members' marginal contributions. Therefore, a manager is fair if she assigns each teammate his expected Shapley value for the observed level of output. It is a self-reinforcing equilibrium if, for a given level of team output, workers believe they will receive their expected Shapley value. Formally, if workers A and B believe that they will respectively receive A (Q) and B (Q) when jointly producing Q; a BNE exists whenever
where A ( ; ) and B ( ; ) are the Shapley values for A and B of abilities and respectively.
For simplicity, again assume the team production function and type distribution of Example 5. I will show that discrimination is an equilibrium when the manager sees output Q = 2M : For any given ability realization h ; i the A's and B's respective Shapley values may be calculated
The Shapley values associated with team h ; i = hH; Li are
The Shapley values associated with team h ; i = hM; M i can be simpli…ed to
The manager, seeing output Q = 2M , know that the team is either hH; Li or hM; M i with equal probability, Therefore, the expected Shapley values (i.e. expectation over the possible teams that could have formed, given that a manager sees output Q = 2M ) are
These discriminatory payments are self-reinforcing if and only if beliefs that they will be paid induce teams to form in the assumed way. Formally, teams hH; Li form
and teams hL; Hi do not form
showing the that the following subset of the above conditions hold su¢ ces to guarantee the existence of a discriminatory equilibrium:
), there exists a discriminatory equilibrium for output level Q = 2M , in which teams h ; i 2 fhH; Li ; hM; M ig form-the existence of discriminatory equilibria is robust to expected Shapley value allocations.
Although changing the allocation rule to expected Shapley values would alter the details of the proofs related to the other results, the basic intuition that talented minorities have the greatest incentive to eschew teamwork remains, and so one may be con…dent that analogous proofs exist. Likewise, the basic consequence of this intuition is that discrimination puts pressure on teams to form in ways that mimic consensus beliefs. So, while there are many alternative allocation rules, of which Shapley values are but one, that a person could analyze, most of them can be expected to exhibit the feature that an average measure of individual contributions in teams resembles beliefs-when the resemblance is exact, it is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, and the beliefs self-reinforce.
Conclusion
Career choice is a fundamental life decision. The model highlights how discriminatory expectations can shape these choices. While minorities are free to choose either teamwork or entrepreneurship in the model, i.e., they face no "closed doors," they may worry about the allocation of credit in team environments where individual contributions cannot be readily measured. When talented minorities expect to receive too little credit, they opt out of team-based careers in favor of entrepreneurship. In contrast, less talented minorities opt in since they enjoy productive gains from teamwork and receive reasonably fair credit for their contributions. As a result, expectations about minority contributions in teams are self-ful…lling. Importantly, the model implies that measures of discrimination based on wage di¤er-entials in …rms overstate the economic e¤ects of discrimination. The bias in the estimates stems from selection-talented minorities …ght discrimination by opting out of the system and pursuing entrepreneurship. The "dual" to this implication is that minorities should outperform bene…ciaries when working individually-a fact which is broadly consistent with a number of studies.
The model also reveals that meritocracy does not eliminate discrimination per se. Managers in the model fairly allocate credit based on their information. Indeed, in a severely discriminatory equilibrium, credit is being correctly allocated, even ex post. Thus, meritorious individuals enjoy the credit they deserve, yet, based on selection expectations, the result is still discriminatory.
In other models of statistical discrimination, leveling the playing …eld between victims and bene…ciaries may remedy the situation. For instance, if the problem is that the discourse system of minorities leads to noisier signals of ability, then the appropriate policy solutions involve either educating majorities to better understand minority discourse or, more realistically, training minorities to communicate in ways that majorities can understand. If the problem is underinvestment in human capital, then subsidy schemes, such as minoritytargeted scholarships, can remedy the problem. In my setting, minorities and majorities are equally skilled and equally able to convey this information at the time of employment. The apparent economic policy solution implied by the model-constrain the occupational choices of individuals so that talented minorities can no longer eschew teamwork-harms minorities even further in the near term. This may be seen as negative, but given that populations of minorities and non-minorities in the model are statistically identical at all times, a change in beliefs su¢ ces to break the discriminatory equilibrium, without enhancing the current generation of minorities'abilities. Thus, the model may suggest cultural rather than economic policy remedies.
The model presented here explains some instances of discrimination that are outside the domain of other models. For instance, the alphabetical discrimination in the market for academic economists highlighted by Einav and Yariv is hard to explain using standard models of discrimination. It seems unlikely that individuals whose last names begin later in the alphabet systematically underinvest in human capital or use a di¤erent dialect than those whose last names come earlier. My model, however, o¤ers an expectational rationale for this phenomenon. Moreover, it is not simply a "just so story"-the model o¤ers sharp out of sample predictions as well. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) observed that the fundamental incentive structure within teams changes, because individual actions are unobservable. That work spawned a substantial theoretical investigation of moral hazard in exogenously formed teams. By endogenizing the teamwork decision, the model here uniquely exposes an adverse selection problem created by the same unobservability of individual contribution in teams.
This model captures one force among many potentially operating in teams (and outside).
A great deal of complexity could be added to the model, but Section 5 illustrates that the fundamental force survives an array of extensions. Its simplicity facilitates incorporation into models with richer institutional details, and indeed, studying this force in a speci…c setting may dictate adding such intricacies, even potentially at a loss of clarity or tractability. This paper's aims are more general.
Like other discrimination models it is static. Future work will examine teamwork decisions in a dynamic setting-when future potential teammates may share the attribute of discrimination or not, and ability may be revealed over time.
Throughout the appendix, the following notational de…nition is useful:
) is always a team forming equilibrium. (b) Under egalitarianism, a team will form i¤ the synergy of production is greater than the di¤erence in worker abilities.
Proof. (a) Since g( ; ) > + , a team forms whenever A and B have identical ability.
Thus, equation (1) must hold:
where the last equality results because and are iid and g is symmetric.
(b) Let synergy be measured by a = g ( ; ) > 0. Then under egalitarianism, a team forms i¤ + + a > 2 and + + a > 2 . This can be rewritten a > and a > , which reduces to a > j j.
Proposition 5 (General) Discrimination victims produce better average solo work than bene…ciaries.
Proof. Abbreviate g( ; ) as g and 1 as for notational simplicity. When no team forms, exactly one worker objects to teamwork because g > + . Therefore, the expectation of a random variable x over the solo sample space can be partitioned as follows:
The second term can be further partitioned
and g imply g and (2) g > + and g imply g > .
Thus, the conditional expected abilities can be simpli…ed as follows:
Because and are iid and g is symmetric with respect to and the di¤erence in the expected ability of Bs who work alone from the expected ability of As who work alone is
De…nition 3 Given and , the lowest type B who will (be permitted by A to) join a team is de…ned by L ( ; ) satisfying g ( ; L ( ; )) = . Similarly, the highest type B who will (willingly) join a team is de…ned by H ( ; ) satisfying g ( ; H ( ; )) (1 ) = H ( ; ).
Remark 1 Observe that as approaches 1, any A type will permit any B type to join the team, although none but the lowest B types will be willing to do so. Formally,
Remark 2 Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the de…nitions of H ( ; ) and L ( ; ) yields
De…nition 4 De…ne the expectation of a random variable ( ; ) conditional on a team forming given A's ability and beliefs about discrimination
where F is distribution of ( and) . Then by the Quotient Rule
For …xed and 0 < < 1 Leibniz Rule may be applied
Lemma 5 If Z ( ; ) is de…ned as in (5) 
Lemma 6 If Z ( ; ) is de…ned as in (5) then as approaches unity Z ( ; ) converges
Proof. Observe from (4) and Lemma 5 that the numerator and denominator of (6) Similarly, the derivative of the numerator's second term with respect to as approaches 1
The derivative of the denominator with respect to as approaches 1
Thus, 
Proof. From (6) Z ( ; ) = (Z( ; ) ( ;H( ; )))( H ( ; ))F 0 (H( ; ))+( ( ;L( ; )) Z( ; ))( L ( ; ))F 0 (L( ; )) F (H( ; )) F (L( ; )) > 0
Observe that ( ; H ( ; )) Z ( ; ) ( ; L ( ; )) and every factor in the numerator and the denominator are always positive for all >^ . Thus,
The form of the lemma results from applying the Mean Value Theorem to the denominator and bounding the F 0 terms in both numerator and denominator. 
From Remark 2 H ( ; 1) = g ( ; 0) whenever H ( ; ) is interior. Observe H ( ; ) is always interior when is near unity, since g ; 2 dF ( ) = 1 2
where the second equality follows because g ( ; 0) = by the regularity assumption and the inequality follows because g ( ; ) > 1 for all and .
Case L ( ; 1) is not interior: Simplify (9) using H ( ; 1) = g ( ; 0) and L ( ; 1) = 0 (because L ( ; 1) is not interior). where the last equality follows because g ( ; 0) = by the regularity assumption. Observe that when = 1 2 the team forming region (i.e. 3 g e ; e e and g e ; e (1 ) e ) is symmetric about the e -axis. Thus e L e ;
